Abstract
The key question with regard to the Black Sea region’s military security evolution is how the standing of the three pillars Türkiye, US/NATO and Russia will transform, and how the main military actors in the region may look in the future. Türkiye, by progressively increasing its military potential and pragmatically performing the role of mediator, is strengthening its credibility as a major regional power. The question remains in what form. Cautious position of the USA during the Russo-Ukrainian War would likely precipitate the decline of the US role in the region. NATO would maintain its standing but its particular components would be rearranged among the European actors and Turkey. Russia will remain aggressive, but this can be deterred. Ukraine is determined to restore its borders, and it is supported by Türkiye, the US/NATO and the EU, though with certain reservations. Three options at the end of the war will be assessed on the premise that the main challenge of current military security is control over Crimea. The paper highlights the key challenges, which need to be mitigated, and the promising trends, which need to be reinforced for achieving the stable peace and security in the region.
Keywords: Black Sea, military, Türkiye, US, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, Crimea
Introduction
It is an axiom that for all participants in the current “International Security Congress – 2024” the desired outcome of any possible future development in the area of the Black Sea region’s military security should bring peace and stability. However, growing uncertainty and turbulence increasingly characterizes the regional security environment. This is provoked by Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, naturally contributing to a higher degree of variability in the prospective regional military security architecture, than during the three rather peaceful post-Cold War decades.
Since the moment the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the former USSR in 1991, the Black Sea region’s military security environment endured three noticeable shifts. The first happened immediately after the relatively peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, and the following dissolution of the Soviet Army resulting in a temporary “security vacuum” in the region. The second shift occurred after the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 (the so-called “911” terrorist attack), and signified a transfer of security focus to “non-traditional” military threats of terrorism, dangers associated with the spread of nuclear and other hazardous substances, and regional security risks related to illegal trafficking of drugs, arms, people, goods, etc. “The August War” of 2008 started the third shift, when a Russian armed attack on Georgia manifested the return of the region to the quasi-Cold War hard security instruments of regular military and coercive diplomacy.
These shifts took place in a mostly peaceful environment in the Black Sea proper, except for the relatively small scale skirmishes near the Georgian port of Poti during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, when Russian naval forces arrived from their base in Sevastopol to block the Georgian sea coast and attacked Georgian missile boats and border guard vessels. This event signalled that a “traditional” hard security environment was returning to the Black Sea. However, the regional military security environment still rested on three rather traditional regional pillars/actors – Türkiye, the United States of America (US)/ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation (Russia).
Things started to change radically from relative post-Cold War stability towards current volatility in 2014, when one of the regional security pillars, Russia, occupied and, illegally annexed the part of the Ukrainian sovereign territory of Crimea, namely the Crimean Autonomous Republic. Then, in 2022, Russia continued its aggressive adventures in the region by launching an unprovoked full-scale aggression against Ukraine; in particular, blocking Black Sea traffic routes, randomly mining waters of the Black Sea in proximity to the Ukrainian coast line, and attempting to seize all of the Northern Black Sea coast line to include attacks on Ukrainian ports in Mykolayiv, Kherson, Ochakiv, Odesa, and Chornomorsk. These attacks ultimately failed, in spite of the temporary occupation of Kherson, but Russia continues regular missile and drone strikes against these Ukrainian ports and adjacent facilities.
In reflecting on these Black Sea region military security developments, scholarly studies of the past three decades have posited many good observations on the subject of the region’s military security evolution. This particular contribution to the International Congress in Istanbul Arel University is a next attempt to capitalize on such previous studies, while incorporating new lessons learned during the more-recent years of the ten-year Russian-Ukrainian War.
Evidently, there are many new and old challenges to be effectively studied. Some of these need to be mitigated. Others are promising trends and opportunities which need to be reinforced to achieve a timely and desired result in building a stable peace and security for the future. The key question with regard to the direction of the Black Sea region’s military security evolution is whether and how the standing of the aforementioned three pillars (Turkey, the US/NATO and Russia) have or will transform, and how the main military actors in the region may look in the near, middle-term and longer-term future.
The following assessment of the Black Sea region’s prospective military security architecture will be grounded on two premises. The first premise is generally-conceptual, suggesting that the main factors influencing strategies and policies of any military actor are security interests and military capabilities. The second premise is regionally-specific and grounded on logical requirements to scrutinize the particular policies and activities of specific regional actors, security situation developments, and trends.
From these premises let’s start with the first pillar of the Black Sea region’s military security – Türkiye.
1. WHITHER TÜRKİYE?
Let’s start with Türkiye, because, at the moment, Türkiye looks to be the most stable regional power amongst the three pillars. Türkiye is demonstrating a stable progress in building the national military capabilities and flexible and pragmatic policies to support its security interests.
In terms of security interests, Türkiye’s balancing approach towards relations with Russia and Ukraine has an important distinction. In the military domain Türkiye cooperates with Ukraine only and not with Russia. By progressively increasing its own military potential and, in parallel, pragmatically performing the roles of mediator and transit actor/referee, Türkiye is strengthening its credibility as a major regional power.
Regarding its military security policy, in 2015 Türkiye displayed an ability to be quite assertive when necessary by shooting down a Russian Su-24 bomber, which multiple times provokingly violated the country’s airspace from Syria. Contrary to Russian expectations Türkiye also was open to conduct foreign military sales with Ukraine. It sold to Ukraine the operational level reconnaissance-attack drones Bayraktar TB2, which played an important role in Ukrainian air defence at the initial stage of the war in early 2022. Furthermore, Turkish manufacturer Baykar Defense and its Ukrainian counterparts became cooperative partners in development of several drone prototypes like Bayraktar Akinci and Bayraktar Kizilelma. There are also several other cooperative defence production projects. The most prominent are Turkish drone manufacturing in Ukraine, and building Ukrainian military vessels, e.g. corvettes for Ukraine in Turkish shipyards.
Since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye is strictly observing the Montreux Convention forbidding the passage of military vessels through the Straits during wartime. In 2023, Türkiye – contrary to Russian demands –freed Ukrainian commanding officers who surrendered during the Russian siege of the Ukrainian city-port Mariupol and were placed in Turkish custody.
In the foreign policy area Türkiye managed to improve relations with Greece and stabilize relations with the US. Türkiye also played, together with the United Nations (UN), an important role in reaching the so-called “grain deal” with Russia to restore shipment of Ukrainian agricultural products through traditional Black Sea traffic routes.
Regarding development of regional military cooperation, in January 2024, Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania signed an agreement on the creation of a joint demining force in the Black Sea, aiming to provide for safe traffic by sea during the Russo-Ukrainian War. All three participating powers are members of NATO although this arrangement was created outside of any existing NATO framework.
But how enduring is Türkiye as a stable pillar of the Black Sea region’s military security? The question remains as to how likely crises such as the attempted military coup of July 2016 may happen in the future, thus contributing a degree of unpredictability to the Turkish role in the Black Sea region’s military security architecture.
There is also a question in what form Turkish role in the Black Sea region will be shaped as a result of the current balancing act of competing trends, relying on growing military capabilities, and cooperative, national interests-based, trends in Turkish regional security policies. This requires an analysis of all the elements of Turkish national power, beyond the current scope of this paper.
Further on, if the recent overall regional activity of Türkiye in the security domain is considered, the most visible instances of Turkish security activities are related to events in countries of the South Caucasus, or of the Middle East. The resulting impression is that for the contemporary Turkish foreign and security policy near-term issues in relations with neighbouring countries like Azerbaijan, Iran, Israel and Syria are more important than longer-term issues of most if any NATO agenda or the security of the Black Sea region.
2. WHITHER US/NATO (OR EU?)?
There are three key factors having a decisive impact on the current and future standing of the US in the Black Sea region’s military security, and these directly relate to NATO, where the US remains a leading power. On one hand, the military capabilities of the US globally are still second to none, but on the other hand, the foreign and internal set of America’s security interests since the end of the Cold War have changed. Therefore, when looking the answers to the question in the heading for this section, it looks more expedient to discuss the shifting security interests of the US, rather than specifics of their still dominating military capabilities.
When compared with the end of the Cold War, the focus of the current United States’ global attention is shifting from Europe towards the Asia-Pacific region, for the most part towards China and North Korea. At the same time, despite some attempts at disengagement, the US is preserving much of the traditional focus on the Middle East.
US-Turkish security interests have diverged considerably in the three decades since the downfall of Soviet/Russian empire. In particular, this resulted in shifting the US regional security partnership within NATO from Türkiye towards the other NATO Balkan countries, namely Bulgaria and Romania.
Meanwhile, Russia’s destabilizing military actions in Ukraine forced the US to preserve and even reinforce a reduced presence in the region. In Section 1247 “Black Sea security and development strategy” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, US President Joseph Biden directs the National Security Council “to develop an interagency strategy with regard to the Black Sea region and Black Sea states”, and for this purpose “(1) to increase coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union; (2) to deepen economic ties; (3) to strengthen energy security; (4) to support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience; and (5) to enhance security assistance with regional partners in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.” (Biden, 2023)
Generally speaking, it is expected that for the near- and mid-term future the US will preserve its leading role in NATO, where regional countries Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania are members, and where Ukraine wants to be in the future (as well as Georgia, in case its intentions are not reversed by a currently pro-Russian government). Therefore, NATO would continue to value and maintain its standing in the Black Sea region (Dupuy, 2024).
However, should the trend for reduction of the US attention to the region continue, the Alliance’s major regional priorities would likely shift in favour of Türkiye and key European actors, i.e. the EU and the UK.
Regarding the Black Sea region’s security-related internal aspects of the US security policy; they are reflected in what must fairly be described as the seriously over-cautious position of the US regarding the war in Ukraine. The rise of isolationism and bitter political infighting inside the political sphere of the US if not timely mitigated, is fraught with negative repercussions for many issues of US security policy, including Black Sea region’s policy. As noted with Türkiye, any analysis of this area requires an examination of all elements of US national power, especially the political situation and the state of the national will. Nevertheless, these aspects of US power obviously may contribute to various shifts in the current US posture in the Black Sea region.
Even given the above considerations, American influence in the Black Sea region still seems rather certain, though possibly a bit lower in priority and less robust in terms of resources and activity. According to the declared intentions the prospects for the US to reassert itself in the region look optimistic, but given a potential lack of political stability inside the US the probability of implementation of these intentions becomes unclear.
It seems fairly natural then, that the EU, given its geographical proximity to the Black Sea region, and visible economic and humanitarian interests of the EU, could not idly watch as the changes in the security environment in this obviously important region for the EU evolve.
The EU has an interest in Ukraine’s securing control of the northern part of the Black Sea coast line – in order to provide credible security for sea ports in Bulgaria and Romania and navigation of the Danube River all the way from the coast to Germany.
The EU has the potential to strengthen its role in the military security sphere in the long run. But in the near-term there are only individual military capabilities like that of France which can be considered as solid representation of the EU in the region. France has a mature nuclear potential and has already declared its readiness to oppose Russians in the Black Sea region. There is also the currently resolute standing of the UK, which is not a member of the EU, but is also interested in deterring Russia globally, including in the Black Sea region.
3. WHITHER RUSSIA?
The Russian Federation, unlike Türkiye and the US/NATO, cannot be regarded as a pillar of the Black Sea region’s security any longer. Just the opposite, in the recent years, by steadily increasing its aggressiveness, culminating in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia unequivocally became the source of aggression and instability. Moreover, even the future of the Russia’s presence in the region looks to be transforming from a given constant to more of a variable. The end state of the on-going Russo-Ukrainian War is likely to be defined by the future role of Ukraine in the Black Sea. This will depend in large part on the potential variations of control over Crimea. This is discussed in more detail later in this paper.
The key to Russian aggressiveness lies in the legacy of the Russian imperial heritage, primarily, in the form of Russia’s surviving imperial ideology. This perverted ideology precipitates a hegemonic military policy – based on the pretence that Russia is the defender of all Slavs, and/or defender of Orthodox Christianity (implying the “liberation of Constantinople”), etc. This was on vivid display in the history of Russian wars of 17-20th centuries, particularly, and during military campaigns leading to occupation and annexation of Crimea at the end of 18th century. This ideology has in large part also been transferred in Putin’s mind to the recreation of the last Russian imperial incarnation – the Soviet Union.
The key demonstration of the Russian imperial heritage in 21st century is still on display in Russian expansionist policy in the Black Sea region, first in 2008, in Georgia, then, in 2014, in Ukraine… In 2016, soon after occupation of Crimea, Putin “jokingly” stated that Russia’s borders never end… In 2022, Ukrainians more clearly recognized that it was not a joke. Russia continues to claim officially those Ukrainian regional capitals like temporarily occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, already liberated Kherson, and never occupied Zaporizia. To this list can be added the routine assertions of the “historically” grounded “Russian” status of cities such as Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Mykolayiv…
The continuity of Russian traditional aggressiveness through the 20th century, when for some 70 years Russia existed in the form of the Soviet Union, was famously noted, for instance, in the “Fulton speech” (1946) by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It is remarkable that many observations of Russia in Churchill’s analysis of almost 80 years ago now sound like revelations in light of the current war.
For instance, Churchill effectively predicted the current nuclear blackmail by Russia, implying that the atomic bomb in possession of “some Communist or neo-Fascist State”…might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world”. Churchill also emphasized yet another factor universally recognized these days as typically Russian, that force is the only argument respected by Russians: “[T]here is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness.” (Churchill, 1946).
There is also one more distinctive feature of typical Russian behaviour in the occupied territories. Russian occupiers became notoriously famous in their disregard of humanitarian needs on the captured territories by destroying cultural and historical heritage items and sites and torturing the local population. In 2024, this was reflected again in a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights judgment that The 2017 OHCHR Report noted in particular, “multiple and grave violations... such as arbitrary arrests and detention... ill-treatment and torture” which involved “elements of sexual violence. The victims were kept incommunicado, tied blindfolded, beaten up, ... electrocuted..., and threatened with rape”. The Court’s judgement reiterated that the victims of these wide spread violations were predominantly Ukrainian soldiers, pro-Ukrainian activists, journalists and Crimean Tatars. Further on, there are many instances in the judgement confirming Russian occupational authorities’ cruelty and numerous violations such as, for instance, “there had been a pattern of prohibiting public gatherings and manifestations of support for Ukraine or the Crimean Tatar community, as well as intimidation and arbitrary detention of organisers of demonstrations” (European Court of Human Rights, 2024).
The Russo-Ukrainian War once again proved that Russian aggressive hegemonic interests and policies are alive. It manifested in annexation of Crimea in 2014, and pretention to label Crimea as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” threatening everything and everyone in the Black Sea region. And this Russian expansionism further progressed in attempts to occupy Ukrainian city-ports of Kherson, Mykolayiv, Odesa and Chornomorsk all along the Ukrainian Black Sea coast. However, once again it so happened that these interests Russia could not sustain by the relevant military capabilities and Russia failed.
So, it would be safe to expect that Russia’s old habit of pretending to dominate in the Black Sea, and disrupting the freedom of navigation across the Black Sea, will persist again in the future. This has begun to reveal itself in the Russian harassment of US/NATO reconnaissance flights over Black Sea international waters. Whether successful or not, it will continue to provoke military conflicts in the Black Sea region, until the moment, when Russia is ultimately deprived of control over Crimea and possession of Crimean ports, and when Russia is facing a much stronger opponent (country or alliance) in the region.
4. UKRAINE?
Meanwhile, it is the question of the future of Ukraine that contributes primarily to the variability of the future ultimate direction of the Black Sea regional military security architecture equation.
Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine conducted a policy of peaceful coexistence in the Black Sea region. Ukraine allowed Crimean Tartars to return to their native lands in Crimea in 1994, following their exile by Soviet dictator Stalin. Ukraine agreed to denuclearize in exchange for security assurances from the US, Russia and the UK contained in the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine adhered to peaceful resolution of territorial and other disputes, and in this manner, for instance, it resolved differences with Romania on sea borders and with Russia on sharing the Soviet Black Sea Fleet’s assets.
Since 1993, Ukraine and Türkiye successfully developed military cooperation, which started with the first visit to independent Ukraine of the Turkish Minister of Defence. In particular, since 1998, Ukraine strongly supported the Turkish initiative on creation and operation of the BLACKSEAFOR naval coalition of Black Sea bordering countries.
Unfortunately, a belligerent Russia repeatedly displays a habit of interpreting any signs of non-aggressive behaviour as signs of weakness. Russia launched an unprovoked aggression against Ukraine in 2014, intensifying it in 2022, and Ukraine had no choice but to fight back.
Ukraine is determined to restore its internationally recognized borders, to punish Russian war criminals, and to make Russia pay for all human and material damages. In this intention Ukraine is supported by Türkiye, the US/NATO and the EU, though with unfortunate delays and reservations.
The growing ability of Ukrainian Armed Forces to carry out air and missile strikes are slowly but steadily degrading the Russian occupiers’ strength in Crimea. In particular, innovative Ukrainian techniques enabled the country to design, produce and employ different types of naval drones which have already forced the bulk of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s combat ships to move from the port of Sevastopol in Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk on the Russian seacoast. This radically reduced the operational capability of Russian warships in the Black Sea (Obrien, 2024).
Regarding the possible impacts of the Ukrainian struggle on the Black Sea region’s military security, three options at the end of the war may be assessed on the premise that the main challenge of the current military security environment in the Black Sea region is control over Crimea.
4.1. If Russia Maintains Control of Crimea
The outcome of this option may be even worse than a status quo prior to the start of the Russian full-scale aggression in February 2022.
While Ukrainians are determined to fight and sustain losses, the fact of the matter is that there is a huge numerical disadvantage between Ukraine and Russia in terms the population, economic, and military potentials, which evidently plays to Russia’s benefit. To mitigate this disadvantage, Ukraine is asking its partners in democratic countries to provide support. Fortunately for Ukraine, critical military, financial and economic support is being provided. However, most of the partners and, primarily, the biggest one the US, appear not to be ready to deliver in timely, comprehensive and effective manner.
Slow delivery and politically driven halts of US support to Ukraine already have demonstrably benefitted Russia on the battlefield, allowing it to accumulate reserves and consolidate its forces. Moreover, artificial restrictions on the use of the foreign armaments, as well as periodically increasing pressures on Ukraine allegedly aimed at avoiding “uncontrolled escalation” on the part of nuclear Russia, led to missed opportunities and big losses for Ukraine.
As a result, the prospects for Russia to preserve control over already-occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, are growing. In event this war turns into a frozen conflict, Russia will definitely use this opportunity to reconstitute its military forces, particularly in Crimea.
Thus, given the history of Russian invasions, there is no chance that Russian policies will become more peaceful than during any time in the past. Just the opposite, an emboldened Russia, as has been already proven many times, will represent an even greater threat to the Black Sea region than before.
4.2. If Ukraine (Not a Member of NATO) Restores Control of Crimea
In spite of the Russian numerical dominance, Ukraine has demonstrated a remarkable endurance and ability to achieve success in economic, technological, diplomatic and, most importantly, in military spheres.
In the currently most crucial sphere, the military domain, Ukraine demonstrated the ability to conduct successful independent operations in the Black Sea region using Ukrainian and Western cruise missiles, as well as Ukrainian and Turkish drones. Moreover, Ukraine managed to develop independently a wide array of aerial, sea surface and sub-surface drones and conducted successful raids even in the absence of partners’ support. This provided Ukraine with the ability to conduct a series of attacks on Russian air, naval and logistical targets in Crimea and in the neighbouring regions of Russia as well.
Following the loss of dozens of naval vessels and combat aircraft in and around Crimean bases, the most capable part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was transferred from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and combat aircraft relocated to continental Russian bases. Continuous Ukrainian attacks on Russian headquarters and ammunition depots in Crimea, on naval, aviation, anti-aircraft and logistical assets in Crimea, as well as in Rostov, Krasnodar, Dagestan and other regions of Russia steadily degrade Russia’s ability to hold the Crimean peninsula. This particular trend, if Ukraine is able to sustain it further, will sooner or later force Russia to abandon Crimea (Economist, 2024).
All this will work to restore the basics of international order and provide for justice, but leaves open the issue of who will be the guarantors of a stable peace and security in the Black Sea region. Moreover, if the issue of deterrence against possible Russian repeated aggression is not answered properly, then the next round of confrontation, this time probably centred on Crimea, is only a matter of time, as in previous cases…
Meanwhile, Ukraine, by reducing Russian dominance in the Black Sea region and restoring its sovereignty over Crimea, strengthens the Turkish position in the region. An outcome such as this is therefore quite congruent with Turkish national interests.
4.3. If Ukraine Restores Control of Crimea and Joins NATO
In the context of this war, Ukraine’s strongest partner is the collective security alliance NATO. While the EU and some distant countries provided mostly financial and humanitarian support, NATO unequivocally supported the military needs of its “distinctive partner” Ukraine.
On one hand, absent a clear formal accession prospect, Ukraine nevertheless appeared already deeply integrated into modes and standards of NATO military operations. Ukraine is fighting and individual NATO member states are providing critical support with armaments and logistics. On the other hand, NATO as an alliance offered Ukraine only political and non-lethal support. Thus, Ukraine’s “half-integration” into NATO took the form of a number of ad hoc arrangements between different members of the alliance and Ukraine (Polyakov, 2024).
The lessons of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO learned during the war would definitely help if a positive political decision on Ukraine’s accession were made. However, abundance of caution – perhaps an overabundance of caution – on the part of the key Western partners makes unclear Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership, which could provide the country with credible security guarantees.
If Ukraine liberates Crimea and joins NATO, the situation in the Black Sea region will be very similar to the situation in the Baltic Sea. In this case, Ukrainian deterrence capabilities will be augmented by the much stronger potential of the Alliance with its nuclear umbrella, boots on the ground, no-fly zone, etc. NATO would in effect become the guarantor of a stable security environment in the Black Sea region. Therefore, the chances for peace and stability in the Black Sea region will be much better than in the alternative scenarios noted earlier. Unfortunately it seems that the probabilities of this last scenario at the moment are much lower than the chances of the previous two.
Conclusion
The Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 signified the ultimate turn away from the earlier post-Cold War security vacuum and focus on the war with terrorism and other non-military threats, back towards the new military confrontation. In 2022, this trend culminated in Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine. In this war Ukraine and its partners managed to reverse the Russian advance and solidify resistance, including many successes in the Black Sea region.
The role of Türkiye as regional security pillar will steadily grow. Declining impact of the US in NATO brings more military presence of the European powers, already visible with the UK and France, and more-distantly visible return of Germany.
Current lack of stability in the region contributes to variability and uncertainty. The best way to provide for predictability is for regional powers to take tougher action against the chronic aggressor Russia, and to harmonize the security interests. The main aim of such cooperation should be to help Ukraine to win and to regain and solidify control over Crimea. This would be in everyone’s interest except Russia’s.
In general terms, the future of the Black Sea region’s military security will be defined as a result of the strategic juxtaposition between the interests of regional powers and their capabilities. If interests potentially can be harmonized, or if there arises a dominant power in the Black Sea region capable of deterring Russian aggression, then the situation is likely to be stable. If not, then the region will drift further towards instability, and its military security will be at the mercy of unpredictable variables…
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