Energy supply resilience at war: Ukrainian experience


Oleksandr Sukhodolia

Head of critical infrastructure, energy and ecological security department, 

Center for security studies, NISS

The resilience of basic vital functions and services (VFS) and critical infrastructure (CI) is a national security priority for any country. For Ukraine, these tasks became particularly relevant on February 24, 2022, with the full-scale armed invasion by Russia and the deliberate destruction of the country's CI by the aggressor.

The war unleashed by Russia has once again demonstrated that the reliable operation of the energy sector is extremely important for the country's survival. The continuity of energy infrastructure affects all other infrastructure sectors and the country's ability to meet the basic needs of society, the economy, and the state.

Despite the massive scale of energy infrastructure destruction, Ukraine has demonstrated a high level of resilience and the ability to provide energy to consumers. In fact, Ukraine has now acquired extensive practical experience in this field.

Therefore, Ukraine’s experience in ensuring the resilience of critical energy infrastructure and the provision of energy services can be valuable for study.

Legislative Basis to Ensure the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services

It should be noted that the task of meeting consumers' energy needs was not a sudden decision caused by the Russian invasion. Developing the capacity of countries to sustain society and the state has a long and successful history of establishing emergency response systems. At the same time, Ukraine continued to improve its legislation and crisis response practices in accordance with contemporary challenges. In particular, new approaches have been developed in the field of CI protection.[1]

The Law of Ukraine "On Critical Infrastructure,"[2] adopted on the eve of the war (December 2021), legislatively defined the tasks of central and local authorities, as well as economic entities (CI operators), to protect CI and provide VFS to society. The Law defined the objective of both protecting CI (i.e., improving security) and enhancing the resilience of its operation to provide vital functions and services to consumers.

In the area of CI security, the main tasks are assigned to the CI operator, who is assisted by the state in the event of a crisis. The relevant activities of responders are regulated by legislation through the introduction of several regulatory mechanisms and tools, in particular, CI protection plans and interoperability plans for actors involved in carrying out protection tasks for specific CI facilities.

However, the security aspect of CI is only part of a more complex challenge, which is to ensure the resilience of CI operation and the provision of VFS to end users. The resilience of such functions/services goes beyond the operation of a single CI facility and requires consideration of various aspects of VFS provision and the involvement of a wide range of actors. Consequently, in terms of ensuring the resilience of service/functions delivery, the Law defines the objectives for:

  • Sectoral Authorities:[3] To develop plans for interaction and maintenance of important functions/services (provided by the sector concerned) in case of disruption of CI facilities.

  • Local Executive Authorities: To develop and approve local programs to ensure the security and resilience of CI, and programs to increase the resilience of territorial communities to crisis situations, including the interruption or deterioration of the provision of vital functions.

Thus, Ukraine, through developing legislation, guided local communities, central authorities, and CI operators towards the development and implementation of measures to ensure the resilience of the operation of CI and the provision of VFS to end users. As far as the functioning of the energy sector in Ukraine is concerned, the resilience of the energy supply to consumers is at stake, even in conditions of disruption of the functioning or destruction of individual power facilities.

At the same time, the implementation of the Law has demonstrated that most responders still focus on the traditional practice of concentrating primarily on the physical protection of CI facilities, for which a separate operator is responsible. In turn, the task of ensuring the "resilience of the vital service/function" requires the involvement of all possible stakeholders, the entire society, and the development of a wider range of response measures. One response may even be the complete replacement of lost (destroyed) CI facilities with other infrastructure or a way of meeting consumer needs.

The full-scale invasion and destruction of critical energy infrastructure by Russian troops, which began in February 2022, only increased the urgency of developing plans for the resilience of the provision of important functions and services and the livelihoods of individual communities, primarily in the combat zones.

The National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) of Ukraine adopted special decisions aimed at intensifying and coordinating the efforts of all potential stakeholders to the scale of destruction of the energy infrastructure. The NSDC of Ukraine defined urgent practical tasks for the national system of CI protection actors on the resilience of energy supply to consumers in its decisions "On Organization of Protection and Security of Operation of Critical Infrastructure and Energy Facilities of Ukraine under Conditions of Hostilities" dated October 17, 2023,[4] and "Regarding Additional Measures to Strengthen the Resilience of the Energy System and Prepare the National Economy for the Autumn-Winter Period 2023/24" dated November 7, 2023.[5]

There was a clear response to the risks of destruction of the country’s substantially centralized energy infrastructure. This was the strategic transformation of Ukraine’s energy system towards the development of distributed generation based on local resources and renewable energy sources. Among other things, the objective was to improve the preparedness of local communities for energy crises by:

  • Updating (approval) of regional development strategies and programs, local programs to increase the use of distributed generation, alternative energy sources, and energy efficiency;

  • Developing and approving local programs to increase the resilience of territorial communities to crises caused by the interruption or deterioration of essential services;

  • Providing alternative (reserve) power supply for CI facilities supporting VFS;

  • Attracting territorial community resources to overcome crisis situations in the energy sector.

It is important to note that Ukraine has also developed related legislation that supports local communities in expanding their ability to meet their needs independently. Thus, an energy legislative and regulatory framework is gradually being formed. It stimulates the expansion of the share of local and renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy balance of territorial communities, as well as the development of distributed energy sources and "smart" local networks. The Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Restoration and 'Green' Transformation of the Energy System of Ukraine" dated June 30, 2023,[6] promotes the development of renewable energy, in particular through the self-production mechanism to meet their own electricity needs by stimulating the work of active consumers (prosumers). The algorithms of operation of small distribution systems, designed to provide power supply management for individual local groups of consumers and communities, are also specified.

The development of energy legislation and the latest energy technologies makes it possible to implement a strategic transformation of energy supply systems and significantly increase Ukraine’s resilience. The development of distributed generation under conditions of high risks of CI destruction allows not only to ensure the energy security of the country and the resilience of the provision of energy services to end users but also to strengthen the national economy by increasing the use of local resources and technologies.

Practical Experience of Ukraine’s Response in the Period 2022-2024

Ukraine's experience in ensuring the resilience of energy supply to meet the needs of end consumers, especially during the targeted destruction of energy infrastructure (power generation, transportation, and distribution facilities) by the Russian Army, deserves special attention. Despite the scale of the destruction,[7] Ukraine was able to supply energy and quickly resume energy supply to consumers in cases of critical infrastructure damage. This was achieved through measures such as strengthening the protection of CI facilities and enhancing the resilience of CI operations.

Regarding the security of critical energy infrastructure, the following measures have been implemented:

  • Strengthening physical protection of CI facilities (tightening the perimeter and territory around facilities).

  • Introducing protection systems against unmanned aerial vehicles and missile strikes (ECM systems, mobile air defense groups, and a three-tier engineering protection system).[8]

  • Organizing anti-ballistic missile defense (covering CI objects with air defense systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine).

According to government officials (State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine) and the Electricity Transmission System Operator (National Power Company "Ukrenergo"), these measures have significantly mitigated the impact of Russian air raids on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. In particular, they have considerably reduced the percentage of damage to energy infrastructure during the deadliest, most coordinated, and complex attacks (by strike drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles), and the consequences of damage have been minimized.

To increase the resilience of the energy supply to consumers, a wide range of measures were applied to reduce energy demand (both voluntary and mandatory) and to provide alternative energy supplies (reserve energy sources, alternative fuels, back-up supply chains).

The efforts of all Ukrainian stakeholders were directed towards these equally important areas. Simultaneously, the government of Ukraine, in general, and individual state authorities, in particular, provided overall coordination of all involved actors, organizational and legislative support for resource mobilization (including international assistance), and adapted legislation to the crisis situation.

For example, based on the study of the response to the seizure of some territories of Ukraine by Russia in 2014, the Anti-Crisis Energy Headquarters was established in 2020 by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.[9] From the onset of large-scale armed aggression by Russia against Ukraine, this headquarters exercised a coordination function, effectively addressing urgent problems that arose during the disruption of critical energy infrastructure operations. Given the scale of challenges to the resilience of the power supply function during the war, anti-crisis headquarters were established at the level of local authorities (under regional state administrations and local governments) as well.[10]

The experience of the energy sector in establishing coordination forms of activity has been extended to other aspects of maintaining communities' normal living conditions. In 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine established the nation-wide Coordination Headquarters for Operational Response[11] to facilitate the coordination of activities of central and local executive authorities, other state bodies, local self-governments, and economic entities of all forms of ownership. This coordination aims to ensure rapid response and the facilitation of normal livelihood conditions for the population during the limitation and/or termination of the electric energy supply. Local executive authorities were also instructed to establish similar headquarters at their level.

Regarding the adoption of legislation, the following measures should be noted:

  • Simplification of legislative requirements to quickly restore energy supply to consumers;[12]

  • Allocation of funds for the rehabilitation of the energy infrastructure and the implementation of decentralized energy supply projects for the provision of VFS;[13]

  • Reduction of customs fees and simplification of the procedures for importing required energy equipment and materials;[14]

  • Simplification of the procedure for connecting distributed energy sources to power grids;[15]

  • Organization and regulation of international assistance (in components, equipment, and materials) for the rehabilitation of damaged energy infrastructure.[16]

The study of the Ukrainian experience makes it possible to identify a range of tasks to ensure the resilience of energy supply to consumers at both the national and community levels (Appendix 8 of the report “Resilience of Critical Energy Infrastructure and Communities”[17]). It should be noted that these objectives are consistent with the principles laid down by Ukrainian legislation regarding the protection of CI in its various operating regimes:

Regular Mode: Analysis of threats and planning of CI operating conditions and response measures;

Preparedness and Prevention: Measures to avoid or mitigate the impacts of threats;

Response: Reaction to an event (threat) to return to the design parameters of the CI and the provision of VFS;

Recovery: Measures to restore the regular functioning of CI and provide VFS based on lessons learned.

The list of response measures outlined in the aforementioned report does not fully reflect all the efforts of the participants involved, nor has it been formalized as a separate response plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. However, the measures implemented by Ukraine to ensure the country’s ability to supply electricity to consumers in 2022–2024 could serve as a prototype for a national energy resilience plan.

It is important to note that the measures taken by the responders in the initial stages (the regular regime, preparation for response) were insufficient on the eve of the large-scale Russian military invasion. The energy system in Ukraine functioned in regular mode until February 24, 2022. Proper work on the analysis of the security environment, particularly the identification of critical military threats to its functioning, was not carried out. There was also no assessment of the critical energy infrastructure disruption risks, i.e., the impact of possible disruptions to the country’s energy infrastructure. Consequently, no adequate plans were prepared to respond to the threat of a large-scale armed invasion and massive destruction of energy infrastructure.

Measures for the protection of the energy sector CI, as well as measures for the provision of energy services to consumers, were developed and applied as an emergency response. However, it was during the period of response to energy infrastructure disruptions that the provision of electricity to end users was achieved through the involvement of a wide range of actors and effective coordination of their efforts. In fact, organizing effective coordination among a variety of stakeholders to ensure the energy supply to consumers is one of the successful lessons to be learned.

The generalization of Ukrainian experience makes it possible to identify two groups of response measures to disruptions of CI functioning, which should be considered when planning the resilience of VFS provision:

1)  Emergency Response Measures: First-line responses to address the negative impact of threats, including:

  • Increasing the number of maintenance crews, their capabilities, as well as streamlining their coordination with military and local authorities for the early but safe resumption of power supply;

  • Accumulating equipment, resources, and materials for rapid repairs, and coordinating actions of all stakeholders to organize the supply of equipment (components) from other regions of Ukraine and the world;

  • Carrying out repair and reconstruction work[18] according to the situations on the ground;

2) Measures to Mitigate the Impact[19] of Threats to CI Functionality and Service Provision/Consumption: Including:

  • Reduced demand for services (energy conservation and efficiency measures, voluntary reduction of energy consumption by eliminating irrelevant production processes);

  • Employment of reserve capacities to increase service delivery (back-up and alternative energy sources);

  • Shifting timing of peak service demand (time shift of production cycles and work schedules);

  • Substitution of some services by others (replacement of infrastructural modes of providing functions/services to reduce energy demand);

Introduction of power consumption restrictions (limits on energy consumption, consumer categories, and frequency of restrictions).

Generalization of Experience and Formalization of Crisis Response Actions to Ensure Resilience of Energy Supply

The study “Resilience of Critical Energy Infrastructure and Communities” provides a detailed comparative analysis of various energy crisis responders' actions, identifying certain stages of crisis response, as well as tasks and mechanisms at those stages. [20]

The analysis of crisis responders' activities in ensuring the resilience of vital functions and services provision and the functioning of CI allows for proposing a model for formalizing these activities. This model serves as a practical tool for formalizing the stages of crisis response, determining the content of activities, and establishing sustainability measures for all stakeholders involved in VFS provision.

We can present resilience requirements schematically as a model of the target function's dynamics in accordance with the crisis response cycle (Fig.).

Model of the target function's dynamics in accordance with the crisis response cycle
Model of the target function's dynamics in accordance with the crisis response cycle

Applying the model makes it possible to substantiate approaches to the formalization of actions and objectives for planning stakeholders' actions to ensure the resilience of VFS provision, specifically by determining:

  • The regular range of parameters (standardized), acceptable level of threat exposure, procedures and time of alerting other systems regarding threats, standard response procedures, etc.;

  • Parameters of critical threats, means, tools, and procedures for preventing and mitigating the impact of threats, the procedures of interaction with other systems in countering the threat, etc.;

  • Response procedures, response time, procedures for obtaining assistance from other stakeholders, etc.;

  • Requirements for redundancy, recovery interaction procedures, recovery time, etc.;

  • Permissible range and time of limited functionality, adaptation to new situations, learning lessons, etc.

The application of such a model facilitates the development of templates of action for the actors involved in all stages of the crisis response cycle and clarifies the necessary parameters of the target function,[21] as well as the possibilities of regulating these parameters.[22]

At the same time, all the activities of potential stakeholders to ensure community livelihood resilience should be reflected in practical steps and formalized decisions.

The tools for planning the resilience of CI, the provision of VFS, or stable functioning of the community should include permanent coordination formats for all potential stakeholders and a formalized document that will determine the actions of all involved actors in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from crises.

Having a developed in advance resilience plan for a crisis enables better preparation for future challenges and faster, lower-cost responses to potential crises.

Of course, the design of resilience plans requires the specification of the response measures, taking into account the specific features of the field of management (community-specific, CI sector, or separate function). The indicative structure of a specific list of resilience plan measures is presented in Table.

Table. Building Resilience Measures Through the Response Cycle
Response cycle stage

Examples of activities

Regular mode (preparation)

Analysis and planning

Planning and implementation of CI protection measures according to a certain level of threats / hazards;

Development of engagement/interaction and response plans;

Exchange of information on best practices;
Security situation analysis and risk assessment

Training and preparationTraining and staff development;
Conducting regular practical trainings

Mitigation / Prevention

Infrastructure SolutionsImplementation of engineering and technical solutions for CI protection;
Modernization of CI facilities and equipment renewal in accordance with identified risks;
Systems redundancy, stock and spare parts accumulation
Organizational decisionsApplication of threat prevention (CI protection) and mitigation measures (replacement of damaged equipment, lost resources or functions with other assets);
situation analysis and response coordination


Emergency responseapplication of «designed» actors, means, tools, and resources (forces of CI operators, community, and consumers) in accordance with defined response plans to specific types of threats;
application of «urgent» solutions to replace lost equipment, resources or functions;
situation analysis and response coordination
Stabilization of the situationReplacement / repair of CI, buildings, and equipment;
involvement of «additional» actors, means, tools, and resources;
application of «medium-term» and «alternative» solutions for the restoration of lost functions / services;
situation analysis and coordinated response


Restoration and modernizationReplacement / repair of CI, buildings, and equipment;
Decision to return to full operation, taking into account new technological opportunities and the need to enhance future sustainability
Lessons learned and adaptationAnalysis of response actions and dissemination of best practices;
Clarification of preparation and response procedures;
Amending legislation;
Specification of priorities for long-term strategic development of the management


In the short term, resilience measures will be driven by CI security, emergency response, and stabilization, which depend largely on the threat environment. In the long term, specific measures are selected based on the strategic development objectives of a given area of management.

In general, planning for the resilience of CI and the provision of VFS should be based on forward-looking infrastructural systems that focus on the future context of CI, new technologies, and knowledge. This approach will help meet one of the main challenges of resilience: adapting quickly and recovering at a better and higher level.

Territorial Community Resilience Planning

The development of a specific resilience plan for a community's livelihood requires a clear understanding by all stakeholders of the targets for the provision of VFS and the minimum capabilities that the community must have to ensure an adequate standard of living.

An important stage in the development of a resilience plan, aimed at creating awareness of target parameters, is a detailed review of the relevant management field. In the case of planning for the resilience of the community energy supply, a review is conducted of the existing energy infrastructure, the community’s targeted energy supply needs, and the community’s own capabilities.

The objective of this stage of community resilience planning is to:

  • Identify consumers and specific facilities that need energy to maintain the essential level of community functioning.

  • Understand the community’s life-support infrastructure functioning peculiarities (specific energy consumption patterns and equipment parameters).

  • Clarify the community’s ability to maintain a certain level of functioning when the external supply chain is interrupted (amount of energy available to the community to maintain the level of service delivery to end users).

  • Identify stakeholders who can potentially contribute to community resilience in a crisis.

This review and analysis will identify priority actions and measures to develop the community’s capabilities. The priorities could be defined by considering the desired objectives of ensuring the resilience of CI and the provision of necessary functions and services to the community, as well as the difference between desirable/necessary and expected/possible levels and the time frame for the functional recovery of CI.[23] That is, the greater the gap between the desired and the expected parameters, the higher the priority given to closing the gap.

It is possible to plan the implementation of individual management decisions (projects) that contribute to the resilience of the VFS to the community based on the identified gaps. For example, it may be decided to develop the community’s own capability to provide a certain level of energy supply based on local or renewable energy sources or to construct backup (reserve) power lines from alternative power supply.

A resilience plan for the provision of socially important functions/services should be based on ensuring the resilience of the relevant infrastructure throughout the supply chain, for example: "water supply" (pumping station, network, consumers), "power supply" (energy source, power grid, consumers), "education" (educational institution, staff, students), "administrative services" (authorities, documents, communication, citizens).

The resilience plan shall be developed by the governance entity responsible for the provision of the service/function, or the authority that implements policies in the relevant area of governance. In the case of community resilience planning, its executive body will be the actor.

In general, the resilience plan should be structured as follows:

  • Needs analysis (overall requirements and minimum consumption).

  • Identification of capabilities (available resources, technologies, and external assistance needs).

  • Identification of threats (list of threats and hazards that may disrupt the function/service and the level of preparedness to respond to their impact that the entity will provide by itself).

  • Establishment of a list of measures to ensure the resilience of VFS (to exploit its own capabilities (resource, organizational) and external assistance to the community).

  • Development of procedures and mechanisms for the interaction of involved stakeholders.

To coordinate the actions of various actors, a mechanism is needed to harmonize the positions and interests of the different stakeholders and to develop solutions that support their commitment to implementing agreed common intentions. This formal mechanism is most often a specially established advisory group (expert, consultative, or working) in which stakeholders are involved to provide the function/service. Sometimes, during crisis response, a crisis response team is set up to focus on finding quick solutions to the crisis (this team is delegated operational leadership of the participants' actions during its work).

The approval of the resilience plan should be carried out by a decision of the planning entity in the form of a binding document (according to the level and scope of responsibility) or a joint agreed decision (protocol, memorandum, or agreement) in which the participants make their own commitments.

Conclusions and Summaries

This publication presents summarized research results on the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, as reflected in the analytical report "Resilience of Critical Energy Infrastructure and Communities." It also includes a generalized overview of Ukraine's experience in responding to disruptions in the functioning of critical energy infrastructure due to the armed invasion of Ukraine in 2022-2024, as well as efforts to increase the resilience of the energy supply to consumers to maintain an adequate level of human and social activity.

Based on the review of tasks defined by the legislation of Ukraine and the responses of involved stakeholders, a conceptual model for formalizing requirements for activities in the field of resilience has been developed. The proposed model simplifies the process of planning the resilience of CI operations or VFS provision according to the stages of the crisis response cycle. The publication provides methods to define the tasks of crisis response actors, necessary and possible levels of critical infrastructure functioning, the provision of vital functions and services, and resilience planning goals. Common approaches to resilience planning and the content of the community resilience plan are proposed.

The publication aims to help governance actors master the fundamentals of the resilience concept, the objectives and content of management actions on the resilience of CI and the provision of VFS, and to begin practical activities towards building a secure and resilient nation that, with a whole-of-society approach, can prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from threats and hazards of any kind.


[1] Organizational and Legal Aspects of Ensuring the Security and Resilience of Critical Infrastructure of Ukraine: analytical report / [Bobro D. G., Ivanyuta S. P., Kondratov S. I., Sukhodolia O. M.] / edited by. O. M. Sukhodolia. Kyiv: NISS, 2019. 224 p. In Ukrainian. URL 

[2] See: URL: 

[3] Public authorities responsible for the implementation of state policy in specific areas usually have a sectoral or industry focus. For instance, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine is responsible for ensuring the functioning of the energy infrastructure.

[4] See: URL:

[5] See: URL

[6] See: URL

[7] During different periods of the war starting in February 2022, 30 to 80% of Ukraine’s energy assets were out of use due to destruction. About 50% of energy sources have not been available to consumers since November 2022 because of continuous attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Russia destroyed almost all of Ukraine’s thermal power plants (TPPs) and two hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) by missile strikes in March–April 2024.

[8] It was envisaged that there would be three levels, layers, or tiers of protection for power facilities in Ukraine (engineering fortifications of different types). The first level involves simple protection against blast waves and debris, such as big bags, gabions, or other simple designs filled with sand, providing defense against indirect hits from missiles or "Shahed" drones. The second level is protection from direct hits by "Shahed" drones. The third level, for the most large-scale structures, involves complex protection from both "Shahed" drones and missiles. See: URL:

[9] On the establishment of the Anti-Crisis Energy Headquarters: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 24.04.2020, No. 312. See: URL %D0 %BF#Text

[10] Sukhodolia O. “Ukrainian Energy Sector under Military Attack: Lessons for Resilience” in the book “War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future”. Tallinn : ICDS, 2023. 85 p. See: URL

[11] On the establishment of the Coordination Headquarters for Rapid Response and Ensuring the Creation of Normal Conditions of Vital Activity of the Population during the Limitation and/or Termination of Electric Power Supply: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 22.09.2023, No. 1033. See: URL %D0 %BF#Text

[12] An interim operating procedure has been approved for distribution system operators (DSOs) to restore the electricity supply to communities cut off by hostilities.

See: URL

[13] See: URL

[14] The Cabinet of Ministers published a resolution providing an exemption from VAT and import duties on the import of generators, transformers, heaters, and other goods necessary for the heating season. See: URL

[15] The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution simplifying the procedure for placing gas piston and gas turbine plants and related networks. See: URL

The National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities (NCREPU) simplified the corresponding connection procedure at its meeting on May 8, 2024. This enables customers to connect their installations to electrical networks more quickly. These changes will contribute to the diversification of electric energy production sources and help cover the power deficit in Ukraine's energy system, especially in regions and cities close to the combat zone. See:URL:

[16] The US Agency for International Development, through the Energy Security Project (USAID ESP), purchased 91 cogeneration plants for 32 cities and 2 universities in Ukraine. These plants provide a stable heat supply for more than 1 million residents of apartment buildings and about 1,000 social facilities. Additionally, these installations can provide a backup power supply to neighboring hospitals and water supply and sanitation facilities. See: URL

[17] Sukhodolia O. Resilience of critical energy infrastructure and communities : report. – Kyiv : NISS, 2024. 160 p. In Ukrainian 

[18] The response was implemented through three schemes:

Temporary/emergency (hours): Restoration of individual objects or system elements on temporary schemes using available materials based on existing infrastructure (welding, bypassing/shunting, banding, replacement of minor parts, etc.).

Short-term (days): Repair after a detailed examination of the entire facility (power units, electrical substations, gas distribution stations) or power supply networks (electric, heat, or gas networks) by replacing damaged elements with new ones or establishing temporary alternative energy supply systems.

Long-term (weeks): Installation of new equipment and construction of new energy supply systems and schemes.

[19] Reducing the imbalance between available supply capacity and the need for VFS can be achieved through the participation of different actors: CI operators' activities (service delivery), activities of service consumers (economic entities, institutions, population), and activities of other actors in the supply chain and service delivery (suppliers of resources, equipment, etc.).

[20] The study analyzed four cases of response to various threats: Ukraine (blocking of fuel supply to thermal power plants in 2014-2015 and physical nationwide destruction of energy infrastructure in 2022-2023), and the USA (impact of a sudden temperature drop during the Texas energy crisis in 2021 and the cyber-attack against operational technology in the “Colonial Pipeline” case in 2021). 


[21] Response targets are defined by legal acts and through the analysis of the needs of service users. For example, permissible periods without electricity are established according to technological requirements (e.g., hospitals, water removal, chemical production) and the needs/requirements of specific consumers (e.g., communities).

[22] Possible parameter management solutions (return to project modes of operation) are predetermined by measures to: improve preparedness for the impact of threats (enhanced protection, resource, and equipment accumulation); mitigate (diversification of energy supply sources, utilization of reserves and resources, substitution of services/functions by others); respond (reduction of needs, use of reserve energy sources); and recover (repair and rebuilding, new ways to meet consumer needs, etc.).

[23] See: Community Resilience Planning Guide. NIST.


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